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BEYOND THEOLOGICAL CONFLICT IN THE
COURTS: THE ISSUE OF ASSISTED SUICIDE
ARTHURJ. DYCK*
Is there a right to die? If "right to die" refers to a right to
refuse medical interventions, then such a legal right exists in the
United States, as its courts have affirmed.1 But if "right to die"
refers also to a right to be assisted in committing suicide, or a
right to have one's life ended, then presently there is no clear
agreement as to whether American courts or legislative bodies
could or should assert such a right. The initiative passed by vot-
ers in Oregon to legislate physician-assisted suicide is receiving
review by its courts.2 Similar initiatives in Washington and Cali-
fornia were both defeated at the ballot box by fifty-four percent
of the votes.3 The American public may or may not be poised to
support physician-assisted suicide, but the question may be taken
out of the hands of voters and decided in the courts. Of course,
the courts could leave the matter to the legislative process, but
that is not a certainty. It is timely, therefore, to ask what the
courts should do. Should courts declare a constitutional right to
die that goes beyond a right to refuse life-saving medical inter-
vention and includes physician-assisted suicide and perhaps
other interventions intended directly to end someone's life?
* Mary B. Saltonstall Professor of Population Ethics, Harvard School of
Public Health and Harvard Divinity School.
1. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960); Schloendorff v.
Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
2. The Oregon Death With Dignity Act (1994); Lee v. State of Oregon,
869 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Or. 1994).
3. Initiative for Death With Dignity, Washington Initiative No. 119
(1991); The California Death With Dignity Act, California Proposition No. 161
(1992). These referenda were defeated by the same margin of 54 percent to 46
percent. See generally M.M. Penrose, Assisted Suicide: A Tough Pill to Swallow, 30
PEPP. L. REv. 689, 708-14 (1993).
504 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 9
Certain legal opinions that have already sought to make a
case for such a right show that this question is not premature.
4
Nor is it misguided to see this question as a moral one as to
whether there ought to be a constitutional right to assisted
suicide.
What this essay contends is that the arguments for assisted
suicide as a constitutional right to die are based upon a particu-
lar moral and theological outlook.5 The courts should seek a
non-theological basis for deciding the constitutionality of laws
for, and laws against assisted suicide and euthanasia. As will be
discussed, there are differing theological traditions implicitly and
explicitly represented in conflicting opinions over what to do
about refusing life-sustaining medical care, especially in cases
involving the administration of artificial nutrition and hydration.
Furthermore, these conflicting theological traditions yield differ-
ing interpretations of self-determination or liberty interests in
such cases. There are, however, some non-theological and plau-
sible reasons for retaining laws against assisted suicide and eutha-
nasia (ie. mercy killing).
I. THEOLOGICAL CONFLICTS IN COURT OPINIONS OVER
WITHDRAWAL OF TREATMENT 6
American courts draw on at least three major moral and the-
ological traditions identifiably present in American courts. In
cases that involve the protection of human life and individual
liberty in the context of medical treatment, these traditions tend
to come into conflict with one another. Opinions of the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court in its decision to allow the cessa-
tion of nutrition and hydration for Paul Brophy contain explicit
assertions of all three traditions.7
Paul Brophy, a fire-fighter in his mid-forties, remained in a
semi-vegetative state from April 1983 through the time of the
decision in September 1986. Doctors had withheld all therapeu-
tic medical interventions in favor of "comfort"-oriented care.
4. For example, Judge Barbara Rothstein, in Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), and Judge Wright,
dissenting from the decision to reverse Judge Rothstein's opinion in
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, No. 94-35534, 1995 WL 94679 (9th Cir.
Mar. 9, 1995).
5. Regarding my use of the term "theological," see infra notes 17-18 and
accompanying text.
6. For an overview of the various authors discussed in this section, see,
e.g., CLAmSSics oF WESTEmRN PHILOSOPIY, (S.M. Cahn ed., 1990); A.J. DycK, ON
HUMAN CARE: AN INTRODUCrION TO ETHICS (1977);JusTrcE (A. Ryan ed., 1993).
7. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986).
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Brophy breathed on his own taking food and water through a
gastrotomy tube, which did not create any adverse side effects.
Medical experts testified that Brophy could live for a number of
years, perhaps as long as twenty years. Four of the seven justices
were convinced that the lower court correctly understood
Brophy's comments to others earlier in his life as a wish on his
part to be allowed to die under these circumstances.
Writing for the majority, Judge Liacos asserted a state inter-
est in carrying out Brophy's wish to die on behalf of Brophy's
right to self-determination. This right, according to Judge
Liacos, had deep roots in the history of the United States. To
express his conception of self-determination, he borrowed a pre-
vious case's quote of John Stuart Mill:
"[Tihe only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilised [sic] community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own
good, either physical or moral, is not a significant warrant.
He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear
because it will be better for him to do so, because it will
make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do
so would be wise or even right."'
By relying on the tradition as portrayed by Mill, Judge Liacos
invoked a tradition that does not view the right to life as natural
and inalienable. Furthermore, the value of one's own life was
regarded as something rationally assessable. The individual
makes this assessment in a private sphere protected from inter-
ference by the state. The right to life, in this tradition, has been
characterized as a "right to be let alone."9 Also, given that indi-
viduals naturally seek pleasure and avoid pain for themselves, it is
deemed reasonable, in certain circumstances, to wish to die
rather than live.
This view of human nature flows from that found in Thomas
Hobbes and John Locke, but not in all important respects. For
Hobbes and Locke, human beings naturally seek to preserve
their own lives. This natural drive is the basis for the claim of a
natural, inalienable individual right to life that cannot be surren-
dered to the sovereign. Indeed, governments are bound to pro-
tect this right.
8. Id. at 633 (quotingJOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, in 43 GREAT BOOKS
OF THE WESTERN WORLD 271 (R. Hutchins ed. 1952), quoted in In re Caulk, 480
A.2d 93 (1984) (DouglasJ, dissenting)).
9. This development is traced in MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF PoLrriAL DIscouRsE (1991).
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Justice Lynch, invoking both Hobbes and Locke, dissented
from the majority decision because "the State's interest in the
preservation of life has not been given appropriate weight."" °
The reference to a Hobbesian perspective is also very explicit
when he described the state's interest in the prevention of sui-
cide as that of preventing "irrational destruction." Note that
from a Hobbesian perspective suicide becomes irrational because
it fails realistically to recognize the natural drive in all of us to
preserve our own lives.
Judge Lynch seemed to combine a Hobbesian tradition with
that found in Jewish and Christian traditions when he character-
ized the state's interest in the preservation of life as an interest in
preserving not only the particular patient's life but also the sanc-
tity of all human life. Maintaining the sanctity of life, he said,
"may well be the reason society invests the State with sovereign
authority.""1 From this reasoning, Lynch asserted that the major-
ity had, in part, nullified the law against suicide.
Judge Nolan agreed with Judge Lynch in his dissenting opin-
ion that Brophy's life and all of life should be better protected.
Like Judge Lynch, Judge Nolan viewed the failure to provide
food and water as the proximate cause of death. In his opinion,
however, Judge Nolan depicted the court as engaged in a theo-
logical quarrel. He considered the decision of the court as strik-
ing a balance in favor of death and against life calling the
decision "another triumph for the forces of secular humanism
(modem paganism)."12 In referring to the decision as "secular
humanism" and "modem paganism," Judge Nolan recalled the
struggle of early Christianity and Judaism against those other reli-
gions and philosophies of the time that approved of suicide and
mercy killing. The Hippocratic Oath, with its prohibitions
against giving poisons to cause death or counseling anyone to do
so, was embraced by Christian physicians, and even a Christian
version, omitting allegiance to Greek deities, also emerged."5
Judge Nolan regarded the majority decision as an imposition of
what he called "anti-life principles." In short, the court has
imposed its theological views on those who regard suicide as
"intrinsically evil."
Note briefly the partially dissenting opinion of Justice
O'Conner. Among other things, he expressed concern about
10. Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 640.
11. Id. at 641.
12. Id. at 640.
13. The Hippocratic Oath and From the Oath According to Hippocrates in So Far
as a Christian May Swear It are reprinted in ETHICS IN MEDICINE: HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES AND CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS 5, 10 (S.J. Reiser et al. eds, 1977).
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the court's description of Brophy's condition as "helpless." He
feared that the majority made their own assessment of Brophy's
"quality of life." He found any court effort to establish an abso-
lute legal right to commit suicide or to measure the quality of life
of the individual involved inconsistent "with this nation's tradi-
tional and fitting reverence for human life." 4 He characterized
this unconditional affirmation of the value of human life as the
"cornerstone" of American law:
Even in cases involving severe and enduring illness, disabil-
ity and "helplessness," society's focus must be on life, not
death, with dignity. By its very nature, every human life
without reference to its condition, has a value that no one
rightfully can deny or measure. Recognition of that truth
is the cornerstone on which American law is built.
15
The reader at this point should not think that these seven
judges repudiated a patient's right to refuse life-saving and life-
sustaining medical interventions. Recall that Brophy was not
receiving, and was not slated to receive, any care other than what
would keep him comfortable until he died. The judges agreed,
as they had in the Saikewitz decision, that care going beyond pro-
viding comfort that is of little or no benefit relative to the
patient's condition, could be rejected as too invasive or
burdensome. 16
What, then, divided the court in Brophy? Brophy was
depicted as someone who could live for years. Hence, failing to
feed him could reasonably be viewed as the reason he would die.
Furthermore, it was difficult to make a convincing case that the
gastrointestinal tube in place was a source of discomfort. Indeed,
one could regard it as a necessary source of comfort, preventing
any possible ill effects of starvation and/or dehydration. For
these reasons it is more difficult to view the majority as affirming
what it purports to affirm, namely, a right to refuse medical treat-
ment. Having invoked the tradition of Mill, the majority inserted
into its opinion references to privacy, autonomy, a right to die
with dignity and a wish for one's death, even in circumstances
some would regard as wrong or harmful to the individual. By
citing Mill as embodying American tradition, the majority opin-
ion rejects the Hobbesian and Lockean traditions of seeing the
14. Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 646.
15. Id.
16. Superintendent of Belchertown St. Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417
(1977). It should be noted that in this case it was Saikewcz's inability to
comprehend a highly invasive procedure that added weight to the decision to
consider the treatment for his leukemia as excessively burdensome.
1995]
508 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 9
desire to preserve one's own life as natural and rational. By cit-
ing Mill, the majority opinion rejects the traditions in American
law that speak of human life as sacred, and whose value defies
assessment. These traditions are embodied in the Declaration of
Independence, which describes an inalienable right to life as
endowed by the Creator. As we shall shortly indicate, this clash
of theological traditions occurs in other court decisions when-
ever a Millian argument, justifying assisted suicide and/or eutha-
nasia, attacks the idea of the sacredness of human life, or the
concept of an inalienable right to life.
But why call these clashes theological? One of the enduring
questions for any theological system or orientation has to do with
the nature of human beings. In the Millian perspective, human
beings naturally seek pleasure and avoid pain. The worth of a
life and its moral significance depends upon how pleasurable or
painful that life is. From this Millian outlook, it is possible to
view one's life as no longer worthwhile, and to do so rationally,
given the pain and/or loss of pleasure being experienced. Hob-
bes, as well as Locke, viewed human beings as naturally driven to
preserve their own lives. From their perspective, the inclination
to kill oneself is regarded as an irrational urge. In Judaism and
Christianity, life is precious, inviolable, and with a worth beyond
human assessment. Human beings are endowed with the ability
and the proclivity to see life as sacred, and to act accordingly.
Human beings may act contrary to their proclivities to nurture,
protect, and treasure life, but when they do so, laws against such
irrational and immoral tendencies are helpful enough to be
enforceable for the overall, albeit imperfect, protection of
human life sufficient to sustain communities. When the question
arises as to whether or not the law should permit assisted suicide,
the concern to protect life rationally and sufficiently informs the
Hobbesian, Judaic and Christian perspectives alike. 7 The Mil-
lian approach is informed by the notions of assessing the worth
of a life and to allow each individual to do so, assisting them if
necessary. The Millian view is uniquely in theological conflict
with the other traditions named. One may call this a metaphysi-
cal quarrel but it does involve explicitly theological traditions.
The purpose in analyzing the opinions in the Brophy deci-
sion is not to comment on their merits. Rather this essay seeks to
show that arguments for the refusal of medical treatment can
provoke dissent whenever such arguments are seen as undermin-
ing current laws aimed at preventing suicide and protecting
human life more generally. The debate can, and does at times,
17. See ARLENE SWIDLER, HUMAN RIGHTS IN RELGIous TRADITnONS (1982).
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turn into a conflict among traditions deemed to be the basis for
American law, even law as such. Insofar as this conflict pits doc-
trines of human nature against one another, the discussion is
endemic to theology and cannot avoid accepting or rejecting
some existing theological views of human nature.
The justices in the case of Susan Rodriguez, decided in 1993
by the Supreme Court of Canada, expressed this kind of con-
flict."l The case involved a constitutional challenge to the Cana-
dian criminal law provision which made it an offense for a
physician to assist in a patient's suicide. Examining this case
allows us to identify and analyze the theological assumptions
about human nature, especially human motivation, underlying
judicial opinions about assisted suicide. This examination will
assist in identifying some examples of such reasoning in Ameri-
can courts which includes those that provide a basis for asserting
a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide.
II. THEOLOGICAL CONFLICT OVER PHYSICIAN-AsSISTED SUICIDE:
THE RODRIGUEZ CASE
The theological assumptions regarding human nature and
motivation underlying the various judgments in Rodriguez -
from the lower British Columbia Supreme Court (B.C.S.C.), to
the British Columbia Court of Appeal (B.C.C.A.), to the
Supreme Court of Canada (S.C.C.) - unfold in a manner not
unlike that of Brophy. In both cases the majority and dissenting
opinions diverged in their underlying assumptions about human
nature and motivation. In Rodriguez, moreover, the majority and
dissenting opinions diverged on their conception of 'justice"-
between justice as based on individual claims of well-being versus
justice as based on the moral requisites of community, which
include the nurture and protection of human life.
An ethical analysis of Rodriguez reveals that the judges' theo-
logical assumptions and conceptions of justice represent a proxy
of their holdings on the criminal prohibition of physician-
assisted suicide. On the one hand, the prevailing judicial posi-
tion, which upheld the latter prohibition of assisted suicide, con-
tained the following features: the assumption that humans are
part of a community naturally inclined to nurture and sustain the
lives of others; a projecting language of universal obligations;
and a conception ofjustice based on the moral requisites of com-
munity. On the other hand, the dissenting position, which
18. Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 107 D.L.R.4th 342 (1993). See also
Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 76 B.C.L.R.2d 145 (B.C. Ct. App. 1993); 18
W.C.B.2d 279 (B.C. Sup. Ct.).
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would have struck down the assisted suicide prohibition as
unconstitutional, contained the following features: the assump-
tion that humans are pleasure-seeking and pain-avoiding beings;
an isolationist language of "rights talk"; and a conception ofjus-
tice that is based on individualist claims of well being.
Without intending to engage in metaphysical debate, the
judgments in Rodriguez fell squarely into discernable theological
or philosophical traditions that render the outcome of the judg-
ment predictable.
A. Background
Susan Rodriguez was suffering from amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis (ALS or Lou Gehrig's Disease) and was diagnosed as
having one to two years to live in April 1991. The case came
before the Supreme Court of Canada in April 1993 and was
decided against her in September 1993. Rodriguez lobbied Par-
liament to change the assisted-suicide laws until her death.
Notwithstanding an allegedly healthy appearance and diagnosed
lack of physical pain and distress, she committed suicide on Feb-
ruary 12, 1994, with the assistance of a doctor and under the
observation of a Canadian Member of Parliament. Divorced, Ms.
Rodriguez left behind a nine-year-old son.
Since some readers may be unfamiliar with Canadian crimi-
nal and constitutional law, a brief explanation of the relevant law
is necessary. In 1972 the offense of attempting suicide was
deleted from the Canadian Criminal Code. However, the offense
of counseling, aiding and abetting suicide was not deleted and,
has remained in force in the following terms since 1972:
Every one who
(a) counsels a person to commit suicide, or
(b) aides or abets a person to commit suicide, whether sui-
cide ensues or not, is guilty of an indictable offence and
liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen
years. 19
Ms. Rodriguez challenged this legislation by reference to the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Canadian
equivalent of the U.S. Bill of Rights) under section 7:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
20
19. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 241 (1985) (Can.).
20. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms), § 7.
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Under the Canadian Constitution, this right (a rough equivalent
to the Due Process Clauses under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments of the Bill of Rights) cannot be infringed, except
where justified as a "reasonable limit," according to a compli-
cated doctrine that will not affect the analysis herein. 21
The trial courtjudge held that there was no right to assisted
suicide, and thus upheld the statute. The majority of the British
Columbia Court of Appeal (B.C.C.A.) upheld that decision, with
the ChiefJustice of British Columbia dissenting. The majority of
the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the B.C.C.A. majority deci-
sion 5-4, producing one majority opinion and three dissenting
opinions. Accordingly, the prohibition on assisted suicide
remains intact today.
B. Theological Approaches to Human Rights
The theological views of human nature of particular judges
essentially predicted their votes in Rodriguez. In contrast to the
views of Mill, Bentham, Hobbes, and Locke, one can depict
rights as linked with responsibilities in a way that actualizes them.
All people have natural inhibitions and proclivities that express
themselves in behavior requisite for the existence and sustenance
of communal life, human life itself, and individual relations with
others. Thus, rights are rendered actual by such behavior,
viewed as among the moral responsibilities that make human
communities, individual life, and relationships possible. Those
natural proclivities include the right and responsibility of procre-
ation, nurture, and refraining from killing and harm..22 In assess-
ing the theological views implicit in the Rodriguez judgments,
then, one needs to keep an eye out for the absence or prevalence
of human connectedness within the particular theological view,
and whether humans are viewed as naturally self-preserving, plea-
sure-seeking/pain-avoiding, or as naturally actualizing the moral
requisites of community.
21. Section 1 of the Charter of Rights reads: "The Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society." Id. § 1. Basically, the Canadian
Constitution puts in writing what amounts to a jurisprudential "strict scrutiny"
test adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in its constitutional law. The only
point to be taken here is that when a statute infringes upon section 7 of the
Charter, it is likely unconstitutional.
22. This view is more thoroughly elaborated in ARTHUR J. DCK,
RETHINKING RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBIITIES (1994). See especially Chapter 5.
1995]
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1. The Preservation of Life as a Natural Responsibility:
Majority Judgments
The majority judgments in Rodrigez all presupposed that
humans naturally wish the life of others. For example, the lower
court decision of Justice Melvin (which upheld the statute as con-
stitutional) presumed from the outset that assisted suicide is "dia-
metrically opposed to the underlying hypothesis upon which a
Charter of Rights and Freedoms is based, namely the sanctity of
human life." 3 This proposition is interesting to us for two
reasons.
First, Justice Melvin presumed that the Constitution natu-
rally seeks to preserve life as its most fundamental responsibility.
This view supports the notion that the community nurtures its
members by protecting the sanctity or inviolability of life, and it
does so to protect individuals and the community itself. One
could also characterize this presumption as Hobbesian, by which
individuals never would surrender their natural self-preservation
tendencies to the state. But attributing a Hobbesian stance to
Justice Melvin is difficult without hearing more about the judge's
view on the rationality of suicide, which he never raised.
Second, the phraseology of Justice Melvin's opinion implic-
itly suggests that nurturing life is somehow universal: he referred
to "the underlying hypothesis upon which a Charter of Rights
and Freedoms is based.. . 4 Justice Melvin, therefore, did not
rely upon a relativist theory based on the peculiar traditions of
Canada; rather, he referred to the natural proclivity of any com-
munity. Since the community manifests itself through laws-and
in particular, the supreme law of the Constitution-it should not
be surprising that this natural tendency becomes the "underlying
hypothesis" of the community.
Justice Melvin was not alone in this view. The majority deci-
sion of the B.C.C.A., authored by Associate Justice Hollinrake,
also invoked the natural tendency to protect life. The Chief Jus-
tice of Canada paraphrased the B.C.C.A. majority position in this
way: "The guiding principle, in [Hollinrake's] view, underlying
society's approach to this problem had always been, and contin-
ued to be, the sanctity of life."25 In a more narrow opinion con-
curring with the majority, Associate Justice Proudfoot echoed
23. Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 107 D.L.R.4th 342, 351 (1993), citing
Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 18 W.C.B.2d 279 (1993).
24. Id. (emphasis added).
25. Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 107 D.L.R.4th 342, 357 (1993).
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this theme: "obviously death is the antithesis of the s.7 guarantee
of 'life, liberty and security of the person.' "26
The majority decision of the S.C.C. provided a more com-
prehensive statement on the natural motivation to cultivate life.
Judge Sopinka did not dismiss the claims of Rodriguez as self-
evidently violating the right to life, liberty, and security of the
person. Instead, he outlined the rationale for opposing suicide,
by reference to the inner logic of the constitutional right to
security of the person, and to the most basic structure of society
and human beings:
I find more merit in the argument that security of the per-
son, by its nature, cannot encompass a right to take action
that will end one's life as security of the person is intrinsi-
cally concerned with the well-being of the living person.
This argument focuses on the generally held and deeply
rooted belief in our society that human life is sacred or
inviolable.... As members of a society based upon respect
for the intrinsic value of human life and on the inherent
dignity of every human being, can we incorporate within
the Constitution, which embodies our most fundamental
values, a right to terminate one's own life in any
circumstances?
2 7
There is much in this statement for students of ethics to con-
sider. First, Judge Sopinka clearly rejected or avoided reference
to individuals as egoists unto their own island. The "belief" and
"respect" are rooted in the "society," not the individual alone,
which is "based upon respect for the intrinsic value of human
life."28
The second element worth highlighting is the use of the
term "rights" to characterize the individual seeking death, and
the complete avoidance of speaking of rights in reference to soci-
ety's "sacred or inviolable" view of life. Similarly, Judge Sopinka
juxtaposes the language of rights ("right to terminate" life) with
the language of morality ("intrinsically concerned . . . with the
well-being of the living persons . . . [which is] sacred or
inviolable") .'
26. Id. at 358.
27. Id. at 389.
28. Id.
29. Judge Sopinka makes the parenthetical comment that his reference
to "sacred" is used "in the non-religious sense described by [RONAL DwoRKIN,
LiFE's DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANAsIA, AND INDIVIDUAL
FREEDOM (1993)] to mean that human life is seen to have a deep intrinsic value
of its own." Id.
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But in taking this view, Judge Sopinka finds himself in ten-
sion with a (perhaps short-lived) tradition within Canadian juris-
prudence that expressed itself during the first few years after the
inception of the Charter of Rights in 1982, whereby liberty and
security of the person emphasized "control over one's bodily
integrity free from state interference and freedom from state-
imposed psychological and emotional stress."" ° Since the dis-
senting opinion made this latter tradition the touchstone of its
theological or metaphysical view, analysis of this point will be
postponed. Judge Sopinka conceded this well-established char-
acterization of "security of the person," finding that such a right
had been breached. The case then ultimately turned on whether
that breach of liberty and security of the person was in accord-
ance "with the principles of fundamental justice."31 Before con-
sidering justice, though, we must catch up with the other judges'
world views.
2. The Right to Be Left Alone: Dissenting Judgments
The dissenting opinion of Chief Justice McEachern in the
court of appeal expressed a view of rights which falls squarely
into the tradition of Bentham and Mill. The Chief Justice stated
that the right to life, liberty, and security to the person "was
enacted for the purpose of ensuring human dignity and individ-
ual control, so long as it harms no one else."32 This theological
viewpoint contains no notion of responsibility to others-indeed,
all that matters is that the individual is left alone, provided the
individual leaves alone the rest of the community. Judge
McLachlin of the Supreme Court adopted this quotation in her
dissent, adding that "[s]ecurity of the person has an element of
personal autonomy, protecting the dignity and privacy of individ-
uals with respect to decisions concerning their own body.""3
Along the same lines, Judge Cory's brief dissent emphasized the
notion of avoiding pain, through a syllogism that suggested
"dying" ought to receive the same constitutional protection as
"living"; hence, the right existed "to choose death with dignity. " "
Judge Cory made no mention of the individual's community
30. Regina v. Morgentaler, 44 D.L.R.4th 385 (1988).
31. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 20, § 7.
32. Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 107 D.L.R.4th 342, 354 (1993).
33. Id. at 415.
34. Judge Cory noted:
If, as I believe, dying is an integral part of living, then as part of life it is
entitled to the same constitutional protection provided by s.7. It
follows that the right to die with dignity should be as well protected as
in any other aspect of the right to life. State prohibitions that would
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(e.g., Ms. Rodriguez's nine-year-old son, other family and
friends), or the general society's desire to sustain and nurture
life. This view presumes that human motivation is based upon an
individual pleasure/pain quotient: the "pleasure" being associ-
ated with "dying with dignity" (which, forJudge Cory, must mean
"living with dignity"); and the pain associated with "a dreadful,
painful death" (which for him must mean a painful life)."
Before assessing the ethics of this position, the logic ought
to be examined. If Judge Cory is correct in saying that death is a
part of life, then why would Ms. Rodriguez's life as a victim of
ALS be treated any differently than her life prior to ALS, in
which case assisted suicide would clearly be outlawed?36 The
answer to'this question may turn on whether there is a qualitative
or quantitative difference between ordinary experience and so-
called "near death" experience. Arguing, in effect, that there is
only a quantitative difference, the Jesuit theologian Karl
Rahner's reasoning is entirely consistent with Judge Cory's, up
until the final conclusion: " 'we do not die at the end, but we die
throughout the whole of life'-so that the contemporary insis-
tence on either discovering or hastening the 'moment of death'
can become as idolatrous as the placement of too great a value
on its indefinite postponement."'
A similar conviction was expressed in a less publicized Cana-
dian story involving an ALS sufferer, Florence Perella, who
argued that "death with dignity" is an "oxymoron, a self-contra-
diction . . . .Dignity has to do with control and self-control.
Death is the loss of all control. That's what dying is."3" There-
fore, instead of seeking death, Perella reached out to her com-
force a dreadful, painful death on a rational but incapacitated
terminally ill patient are an affront to human dignity.
Id. at 413.
35. Id.
36. Judge Cory's reasoning, on the one hand, points to treating "near
death" the same as all life, suggesting that life should be sustained just as it was
prior to contracting ALS; and on the other hand, the reasoning points to
treating pain as a justification for ending life, suggesting that death might be a
viable option throughout one's life. Id.
37. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 249 (1993).
38. Id. H. Shepherd, Facing Down Death; ALS Victim Welcomes 'Learning
Experience' Lost to Those Who Choose Assisted Suicide, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Mar. 6,
1994, at A23. Ms. Perella expressed great respect for the efforts of Ms.
Rodriguez, but wished to offer an "alternative viewpoint": "I consider
euthanasia and 'doctor-assisted suicide' to be, in most cases, another triumph of
the practical over the spiritual. 'Dying is the ultimate learning experience. As
we lose control of our lives, we gain the ability to listen to what life wants to
teach us, to receive the love that people want to give us, and, perhaps, to be
surprised by God.'" Id.
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munity in a manner which brought a broad range of pleasant
surprises.39 Thus, for Rahner and Perella, there is no fundamen-
tal shift in life perspective when one moves from ordinary experi-
ence to "near death" experience. The point to be taken here is
that the logic of the pleasure/pain quotient forwarded by the
dissenting opinions requires an important shift of perspectives,
whereby "near death" evaluations of individual pleasure and pain
are treated as qualitatively different (as opposed to quantitatively
different) from everything preceding that "near death"
experience.
The viewpoint and language employed by the dissents
resemble an individualistic and disconnected approach to
human rights. The language is one of "right[s]," "protect[ion]"
and autonomy," with an emphasis on the "body," and no refer-
ence to society or the community whatsoever. The theological
stance is based, to repeat, on the Millian notion that one has the
right to be left alone as long as one does not harm others. And if
it was not already clear that liberty and security amounted to the
"right to be left alone," Judge McLachlin underscored that view
by invoking the right to privacy: the right to security of the per-
son "encompasses the notion of dignity and the right to
privacy." 4°
The other notable feature of the dissenting judges' theology
is the implicit rejection of the Hobbesian notion that individuals
are naturally self-preserving. The "right to die" amounts to a
concession that life ought not be preserved in certain circum-
stances. This rejection harkens back to the qualitative shift
required to sustain the logic of the pleasure/pain quotient
referred to above. That is, the "near death" pleasure/pain con-
siderations are treated as qualitatively different than everything
preceding that "near death" experience. It is this qualitative dif-
ference in the ALS sufferer's life that rejects the Hobbesian
stance, as the qualitative shift leaves behind the desire to preserve
oneself. Indeed, it is upon this qualitative shift that the dissent
rests their reasons.
To support her position, Judge McLachlin cited the notable
Morgentaler case,"1 in which the Supreme Court of Canada struck
down the existing federal abortion law that arbitrarily denied or
39. The Court stated: "One of the most inspiring things Perella has found
in her own illness, she says, is the way her former husband, their four
children-aged 25 to 30-and other friends and even strangers have rallied to
her aid." Id. Thus, as discussed later, Perella's language indicates attachment,
in contrast to the dissenting judges' language of alienation.
40. Rodriguez, 107 D.L.14th at 414.
41. Regina v. Morgentaler, 44 D.L.R.4th 385 (1988).
BEYOND THEOLOGICAL CONFLICT
delayed therapeutic abortions to some women. Judge McLachlin
viewed the decision as dispositive of the issue in Rodriguez. How-
ever, she may have neglected an important theme in Morgentaler
which endeavored to place the individual within the context of
community: "The Charter is predicated on a particular concep-
tion of the place of the individual in society. An individual is not
a totally independent entity disconnected from the society in
which he or she lives."42 Thus, Judge, McLachlin may have sold
short the fuller conception of rights as forwarded in Morgentaler,
which attempted to map out the individual within the commu-
nity rather than isolating that individual in a shroud of privacy
rights.
In any event, this position carried the day on the right to
"security of the person." The Canadian Supreme Court followed
the Morgentaler principle that security of the person protects bod-
ily integrity and prevents the state from imposing psychological
duress upon individuals making fundamental life decisions. The
remaining issue concerned whether the infringement of security
of the person was consistent with the "principles of fundamental
justice.""
C. Conceptions of Justice
1. Justice as Moral Responsibilities: Majority Judgments
The opinions upholding the statute understood justice not
solely as self- determination; rather, justice embraced a set of uni-
versal goals for moral responsibility in a community. The dissent-
ing opinions conceived ofjustice as pertaining to individuals and
their claims to rights.
The majority opinion of the B.C.C.A. addressed itself to the
question of whether the "principles of fundamental justice" per-
mit the prohibition of assisted suicide, and the entailing loss of
security to the person. Justice Hollinrake answered the question
in the affirmative, arguing that justice necessitates that the com-
munity nurture the sanctity of life. Indeed, the majority opinion
was at a loss to see how the principles of fundamental justice
could immunize an individual from the prohibition against
assisted suicide, "when that person is one of those members of
society the section is intended to protect in keeping with the con-
cept of the sanctity of life." Justice Hollinrake expressed a view
of "justice," first of all, which uses the language of moral cogni-
tion: reference is made to society, society's protection of mem-
42. Id at 485.
43. Rodriguez, 107 D.L.R. at 414.
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bers of that society, and the preservation of "the sanctity of life."
The society envisioned under Justice Hollinrake's view of justice
is not one which leaves the individual alone, on the contrary, it is
responsible for its members' lives. Justice Hollinrake expected,
almost matter-of-factly, thatjustice would require a community to
take responsibility for an individual whose life was endangered.
More important than the language, though, is the notion
thatjustice requires the community to nurture its members, or in
the words of Justice Hollinrake, "preserv[e] the sanctity of life."
Thus, not only did Justice Hollinrake assume that human motiva-
tion naturally preserves the sanctity of life, but he viewed justice
as representing the moral responsibilities (in this case, nurturing
life) that are requisites of community.
Judge Sopinka added much content to this general notion
of justice representing the moral requisites of community. He
cited the American constitutional scholar Laurence Tribe for the
proposition that justice does not rest on a narrow view of the
individual:
The right of a patient to accelerate death ... depends on a
broader conception of individual rights than any con-
tained in common law principles. A right to determine
when and how to die would have to rest on constitutional
principles of privacy and personhood or on broad, perhaps
paradoxical, conceptions of self-determination.'
Thus, Judge Sopinka rejected the notion that justice amounts to
individual-based principles of privacy. He reinforced this by
commenting that "the court must be careful that [the principles
of fundamental justice] do not become principles which are of
fundamental justice in the eye of the beholder only."45 So ifjus-
tice is not based on the "I" only, then what is its focus?
Sopinka began to answer this question by reference to soci-
ety: justice was equated with "principles upon which there is
some consensus that they are vital or fundamental to our societal
notion ofjustice .... I He then criticized the definition ofjus-
tice forwarded by Judge McLachlin's dissent, arguing that
"respect for human dignity and autonomy" (her sole criteria) is
but one component of justice "upon which our society is
based."47 Instead, Judge Sopinka viewed justice as embodying
the requisites of the community, ironically citing a former
44. Rodriguez, 107 D.L.R.4th at 392 (citing LAURENCE TIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw 1370 (2d ed. 1988)).
45. Rodriguez, 107 D.L.R4th at 392.
46. Id at 393.
47. Id at 394.
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(majority) decision ofJudge McLachlin to that effect: "The prin-
ciples of fundamental justice are concerned not only with the
interest of the person who claims his liberty has been limited, but
with the protection of society."4" Thus, determining the content
of justice in the context of assisted suicide required reference "to
the state's interest in protecting the vulnerable ... and societal
beliefs which are said to be represented by the prohibition."49
Judge Sopinka maintained:
[Section 242's] purpose is grounded in the state interest in
protecting life and reflects the policy of the state that
human life should not be depreciated by allowing life to be
taken. This policy finds expression not only in the provi-
sions of our Criminal Code which prohibit murder and
other violent acts against others, notwithstanding the con-
sent of the victim, but also in the policy against capital pun-
ishment.... This is not only a policy of the state, however,
but is part of our fundamental conception of the sanctity
of human life.. . "Preservation of human life is acknowl-
edged to be a fundamental value of our society."50
Judge Sopinka then underscored this conception of justice,
which expresses the moral requisites of community, by outlining
the history of suicide provisions, common law views of medical
protection for the terminally ill, and legislation in other coun-
tries. Finally, Judge Sopinka cut through the controversial dis-
tinctions between withdrawal of treatment and assisted suicide
with the conclusion that,
[t]o the extent that there is a consensus, it is that human
life must be respected and we must be careful not to
undermine the institutions that protect it .... In uphold-
ing the respect for life, [the statute] may discourage those
who consider that life is unbearable at a particular
moment, or who perceive themselves to be a burden upon
others, from committing suicide.5"
In short, the majority opinion characterized justice as an ideal
necessarily implying a moral responsibility of the Canadian state
and community to preserve, nurture, and sustain the sanctity of
human life. Judge Sopinka painted a picture of Canadian justice
48. Id. at 395 (citing Cunningham v. Canada, 80 C.C.C.3d 492, 499
(1993)).
49. Rodriguez 107 D.L.R4th at 396.
50. Id. The last sentence cites THE LAW REFoRm COMMISSION WORKING
PAPER, No. 28, EUTHANASIA, AIDING SUICIDE AND CESSATION OF TREATENT 36
(1982).
51. -Rodriguez, 107 D.L.R4th at 406.
1995]
520 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 9
that reaches out to those perceiving themselves as "a burden
upon others" and seeks to prove them wrong.
2. Justice in the "I" of the Beholder: Dissenting Judgments
In stark contrast to the majority's conception of justice, the
dissenting conception of justice is markedly individualistic. This
individualistic conception of justice is clearly asserted in Judge
McLachlin's dissenting opinion.
With justice and the individual in mind, Judge McLachlin
cited a devastating conception of the principles of fundamental
justice penned by Chief Justice Lamer in a previous case where
he argued that, "[I]t is not appropriate for the state to thwart
the exercise of the accused's right by attempting to bring societal
interests into the principles of fundamental justice and to
thereby limit an accused's s.7 rights."5" It should not be surpris-
ing, then, that the dissenting opinion queried whether the "view"
of Ms. Rodriguez that "it makes no sense to continue living..."
sufficiently justified her assisted suicide.5" Judge McLachlin con-
tinued rhetorically, "[blut what value is there in life without the
choice to do what one wants with one's life .... Thus, under
this view justice preserves the individual well-being, in the indi-
vidual's quest for pleasure and avoidance of pain.
To be sure, under this narrow conception of justice, which
seems to place all of its faith in the individual, there is no "value"
in a life without choice, and without a good reason for continu-
ing to live. The view of Ms. Rodriguez was that continuing to live
made no sense and that view represents the critical variable
determining justice in this case. Since the view of Ms. Rodriguez
becomes the only lens through which justice is determined, the
result of permitting an assisted suicide is quite logical. ButJudge
McLachlin's conception of justice not only excludes a broader
vision ofjustice involving the requisites of society, it suggests that
"societal interests" would "thwart the exercise of the accused's
right."55 Thus, societal interests not only play no role in justice,
they may very well deny the individual desire to die. Indeed,
52. Id. at 418 (citing Regina v. Swain, 63 C.C.C.3d 481, 509 (1991)). It is
arguably misleading to leave the quote standing alone, for Chief Justice Lamer
went on to say that "societal interests" are to be considered under the
"reasonable limits" of the Charter. But the point here is to note that this
particular conception of justice, asserted by Justice Lamer (and Judge
McLachlin by her adoption of the test) undeniably treats societal interests as
irrelevant to the principles of fundamental justice.
53. Rodriguez, 107 D.L.R4th at 419.
54. Id. at 420.
55. Id. at 418 (citing Regina v. Swain, 63 C.C.C.3d 481, 509 (1991)).
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Judge Sopinka made this very point when he argued that justice
will thwart individual desires to end life because it represents the
kaleidoscope of moral responsibilities that all human beings
expect from one another.
Perhaps fittingly, little more can be said of this dissenting
view ofjustice because the analysis is as terse as its message. Once
society is excluded from the dissenting conception of justice, its
substance resembles more a microscope than a kaleidoscope. In
the final analysis, this dissenting view ofjustice leaves the individ-
ual to her own devices while the majority view permits the com-
munity to reach out in the name of the moral requisite of
sustaining life.
In deciding the question of whether a constitutional right to
assisted suicide existed, the Canadian Supreme Court exhibited a
clash between quite different perspectives. The majority
defended a doctrine supporting life's inviolability and the minor-
ity countered with a Millian doctrine viewing life's value as sub-
ject to a very personal and private assessment of each individual.
The minority position in the Canadian court is represented in
court opinions in the United States. In other words, positions
that could be used to argue for a constitutional right to physi-
cian-assisted suicide have already been expressed in American
courts, including dissenting opinions in the United States
Supreme Court in the case of Nancy Beth Cruzan.56
III. MILLIAN THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES FAVORABLE TO
ASSISTED SUICIDE: AMERICAN COURTS
A. The Bouvia Case
To begin with, consider the opinions in the case of Elizabeth
Bouvia.57 Bouvia was a 28-year-old woman being cared for in one
of Los Angeles County's facilities. She suffered from cerebral
palsy, and her disease had progressed to the point where she
required care and assistance for all of her physical needs and
pain relief for arthritis. She also required supplemental nutrition
in the form of a nasogastric tube. She petitioned to remove this
tube. Removal of the tube was expected to lead to death by star-
vation. The patient was considered by all to be mentally compe-
tent, and beyond that, of a keen and lively mind. The tube was
being well tolerated physically.
In the court's unanimous view, her mental and emotional
feelings deserved respect. "To petitioner," wrote the court, "it is
56. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
57. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
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a dismal prospect to live with this hated and unwanted device
attached to her .... She has the right to have it removed imme-
diately.""8 The court rejected the trial court's concern that
Bouvia wished to commit suicide with the State's help rather
than exercise her right to refuse treatment. The court found no
evidence for this position and interpreted the case as an assertion
of the right to refuse medical treatment. This right "[was] recog-
nized as a part of the right of privacy protected by both the state
and federal constitutions." 9 The exercise of it "require[d] no
one's approval."' The patient's interests and desires repre-
sented the key ingredients to the decision. Furthermore, the
decision to refuse treatment was not limited to patients regarded
to be " 'terminal' . . . and [the right did] not need the sanction
... [of] any legislative act, directing how and when it shall be
exercised."6" "It [was] a moral and philosophical decision that,
being a competent adult, [was] hers alone."6 2 The court spoke
of the possibility that Ms. Bouvia regarded her existence as
"meaningless" and emphasized her immobility and dependence
on others.63
The court chided the medical practitioners for their invoca-
tion of an interest in the preservation of life:
It is incongruous, if not monstrous, for medical practition-
ers to assert their right to preserve a life that someone else
must live, or more accurately, endure for "15 to 20 years."
We cannot conceive it to be the policy of this State to
inflict such an ordeal on anyone.6
This strongly stated opposition to the efforts to preserve life was
not intended to sanction suicide but rather the decision to refuse
treatment and let nature take its course. Assisted suicide, by
comparison, remained banned. 65 The state in this case main-
tained an interest "in preserving and recognizing the sanctity of
life."66
58. Id. at 299.
59. Id. at 301.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 302.
62. Id. at 305.
63. Id. at 304.
64. Id. at 305.
65. Any affirmative, direct conduct providing the means by which an
individual "could physically and immediately inflict some death producing
injury upon himself" remained unlawful. Id. at 306 (quoting In reJoseph G.,
667 P.2d 1176 (Cal. 1983)).
66. Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
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The reader may rightly ask at this point what the problem is,
given that the court appealed to the "sanctity of life" and con-
tended that its decision did not undercut this interest. The con-
curring opinion of Justice Compton illustrates the problem. For
Justice Compton, Bouvia made a "conscious and informed choice
that she prefers death to continued existence in her helpless and
to her intolerable condition .... [S] he has an absolute right to
effectuate that decision."67 Justice Compton found Bouvia's
need to accomplish her death by self-starvation inhumane. As
such, Justice Compton maintained:
The right to die is an integral part of our right to control
our own destinies so long as the rights of others are not
affected. That right should, in my opinion, include the
ability to enlist assistance from others including the medi-
cal profession, in making death as painless and quick as
possible.
6 8
Justice Compton did not doubt that Bouvia wanted to com-
mit suicide, and described the majority opinion as a "dance"
around the issue.69 She did not think that the medical profes-
sion would have any difficulty accommodating individuals in
Bouvia's situation, because it already declined to follow the Hip-
pocratic Oath in the context of abortion.7" At the end of her
opinion, Justice Compton pleaded for "realistic" approaches
toward those for whom death would come as a welcome relief.7"
According to Justice Compton "[i]f there is ever a time when we
ought to be able to get the 'government off our backs,' it is when
we face death-either by choice or otherwise."72
This last idea, that governments should "get off our backs" at
the time individuals "face death," highlights the view of all the
justices in this case that Bouvia made a decision that was hers alone
to make. The court saw what she was deciding as so purely pri-
vate and personal that the concern of her physicians to preserve
her life was described as "incongruous, if not monstrous."" No
allowance whatsoever was made for an abiding, natural desire to
preserve one's own life, t la Hobbes and Locke, nor any procliv-
ity to nurture life, a requisite for the existence and maintenance
of human communities.
67. Id. at 307.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 307-08.
71. Id. at 308.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 305.
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It is a small wonder, then, that neither the majority norJus-
tice Compton predicted Bouvia's decision to continue to live and
to receive the necessary nutrition and hydration for that purpose.
The majority thought that they were granting Bouvia her wish to
be free of the nasogastric tube; Justice Compton thought that
Bouvia wished to die, preferably as soon as possible.74 Neither
the majority norJustice Compton depicted Bouvia as someone in
a relationship with medical caregivers who wished life for Bouvia,
an individual described as having an intelligent and lively mind.
The court did not consider the continued worth of this relation-
ship and of Bouvia's own life. Evidently that relationship and that
life counted for something. Bouvia continued to live out her nat-
ural days, not as the court and her lawyers thought, but as Bouvia
actually decided.75 She did not, as did the court, see the life pre-
serving efforts of her caregivers as "incongruous" or "monstrous",
but instead accepted their efforts on her behalf.
It is noteworthy that the court did not actually represent the
wishes of Bouvia. Indeed, the court split as to what constitutional
rights she could assert: the right to refuse treatment or the right
to assistance in dying. The right to refuse treatment gave Bouvia
the time to assert her right to life which the right to assistance in
dying would not. The presumption that Bouvia wanted to die or
refuse to extend her life actually represents a theological/meta-
physical construction of the court. It embraces a dim view of a
person so utterly dependent upon others, so physically helpless,
that the value of living was reduced to zero for Justice Compton,
and the value of life-sustaining efforts was reduced to zero for the
majority. This is a particular use of the Benthamite and Millian
calculus of the ratio of pleasure and pain, deemed applicable to
the meaningfulness of one's very continued existence. Indeed,
the court made this explicit in its opinion when it argued that:
"[Bouvia], as the patient, lying helplessly in bed, unable to care
for herself, may consider her existence meaningless. She cannot
be faulted for so concluding."76 At the same time, they faulted
the medical professionals who advocated for her life, and who
did not regard it as devoid of all meaning or significance. Fur-
thermore, the court rejected the contention of Bouvia's physi-
74. Did her lawyer know her wishes? Richard S. Scott led an ACLU team
representing Elizabeth Bouvia. On August 8, 1992, he killed himself with a
gun. He was the first counsel for the Hemlock Society, and said to have been
suffering from depression at the time of his death. Ms. Bouvia currently lives in
Westwood, California. Gail Diane Cox, Advocate Takes His Own Life, NAT'L L. J.,
Aug. 24, 1992, at 6.
75. Id.
76. Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
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cians and the county hospital that forcing them to treat Bouvia
for pain, while at the same time allowing her to starve to death,
violated the rights of other patients who suffered from chronic
illnesses. Indeed, disabled individuals held vigils at the hospital
to try to persuade Bouvia to accept the means necessary to sus-
tain her life. Justice Compton, by contrast stated in her opinion,
"I can only hope that her [Bouvia's] courage, persistence and
example will cause our society to deal realistically with the plight
of those unfortunate individuals to whom death beckons as a wel-
come respite from suffering., 77 Thus, Justice Compton treated
positively the possibility that the example of someone being
assisted to end life may serve to encourage others to do the same.
At no point did she regard such social contagion as a threat to
anyone's right to life or as a threat to the right to have the worth
and significance of their lives affirmed rather than doubted or
denied. She firmly described Bouvia's right to die as a right that
harms no one else, and one that should include a right to enlist
the assistance of others, including medical professionals "in mak-
ing death as painless and quick as possible."7 ' This exemplifies
the Millian view of freedom over one's own health and body,
without interference by others, provided no one else is harmed:
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.
He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear
because it will be better for him to do so, because it will
make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do
so would be wise, or even right.... Over himself, over his
own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.
79
Justice Compton does not include as harm to others the
implications of the practice she favored for the perceived worth
and future care of the disabled and the chronically ill, though
these concerns were being expressed to the public by the dis-
abled and to the court by Bouvia's caregivers. The view of harm
to others shared by Justice Compton and the majority of the
court does not seem to be tempered by elements in Mill's
thought regarding justice as a name for stringent moral rules
that are "essentials of human well-being," forbid human beings
to hurt one another, make "safe for us the very groundwork of
77. Id. at 308.
78. Id. at 307.
79. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART
MILL 197 (Marshall Cohen ed., 1961).
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our existence," and are "the main element in determining the
... social feelings of mankind.8" The court exhibits what Mary
Ann Glendon sees as a "streamlined version of Mill" making up a
strong component of American courts' understanding of
rights.81
As we have seen, not only did Justice Compton impute a
desire on Bouvia's part to have her life ended, but she expressed
the hope that society would be encouraged "to deal realistically,"
as she put it, with such desires.8 2 She hoped that the law against
physician-assisted suicide would be abolished or overturned.
Although she did not explicitly regard her advocacy as based on
theological premises regarding human nature and the individ-
ual's relation to communities, she nevertheless assumed that her
view of what rights Bouvia had was somehow theologically neu-
tral or purely secular. Or to put it another way, Justice Compton
assumed that the law against physician-assisted suicide imposed
itself on individual choice, not its abolition. But that means that
Justice Compton does not factor in as "harm to others" what
Judge Sopinka in Rodriguez calls "undermining the institutions
that protect [life]," institutions which, by "upholding the respect
for life... may discourage those who consider that life is unbear-
able at a particular moment, or who perceive themselves to be a
burden upon others, from committing suicide."" This is a very
different perspective on communal responsibilities by and for its
members than the one assumed by Justice Compton.
Whereas Justice Compton did not explicitly address how the-
ology may be involved in her perspective, or those she opposes,
Supreme Court Justice Stevens did. In Cruzan, Stevens argued
that the State of Missouri wrongly took a theological position, as
opposed to his secular, theologically neutral view.84 If courts
adopted the position taken by Stevens, they would view this Mil-
lian position as secular, while regarding opposition to it as inap-
propriately theological or religious. And if Justice Scalia is
correct, that would have enormous implications for constitu-
tional law. Justice Scalia argues that Justice Stevens provided a
rationale for a constitutional basis for permitting suicide, not just
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.8 5 Justice Stevens is mis-
taken about the theological neutrality of his opinion, for it could
80. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN
STUART MILL 391-92, 385 (Marshall Cohen ed., 1961).
81. GLENDON, supra note 9, at 72.
82. Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 308.
83. Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 107 D.L.R.4th 342, 390 (1993).
84. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 350 (1990).
85. Id. at 299-300.
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indeed, unless qualified in ways it is not now, make a case for a
constitutional right to assisted suicide and non-interference in
decisions to commit suicide.
B. An Unsuccessful Quest for Theological Neutrality: Justice Stevens
in the Cruzan Case
In 1988, the parents of Nancy Cruzan, who was diagnosed as
in a "persistent vegetative state," had been denied by the
Supreme Court of Missouri of their request to have nutrition and
hydration withdrawn from their daughter.86 In 1990, the United
States Supreme Court upheld the Missouri law which allows for
such refusal of treatment only upon a showing of clear and con-
vincing evidence that the patient wishes to do so. It should be
emphasized that neither the Supreme Court of Missouri nor the
United States Supreme Court would deny Nancy Cruzan a right
to refuse treatment. Indeed, nutrition and hydration was
stopped later when more evidence for her wish to cease medical
treatment was presented. Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion,
however, should briefly be examined because it goes beyond the
affirmation of a right to refuse treatment.
Justice Stevens cited what he considered the heart of the
Missouri Supreme Court's stated interest in life: an interest in
prolonging the lives of individual patients and "an interest in the
sanctity of life itself."87 Furthermore, the Missouri court's inter-
est in life was unqualified in the sense that it was not conditional
on the "quality of life" of any individual patient. As the majority
stateed, "[t] he state's concern with the sanctity of life rests on the
principle that life is precious and worthy of preservation without
regard to its quality."88 This prompted Justice Stevens to charac-
terize Missouri's policy as one that "treats life as a theoretical
abstraction severed from, and indeed opposed to, the person of
Nancy Cruzan."89 Moreover, Justice Stevens maintained that the
Supreme Court's opinion "failed to respect the best interests of
the patient."9" The Court focused instead on her constitutional
right to refuse treatment and whether her wishes to be free of
unwanted medical treatment were known.
Justice Stevens laid the foundation for his own view by
stressing the highly individual and private nature of any choices
86. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d. 408, 411 (Mo. 1988).
87. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 335 (quoting Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408,
419 (1988)).
88. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 335 n.8.
89. Id. at 338.
90. Id.
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involving one's own death or the possibility of it. He argued that
"[t] he sanctity, and individual privacy, of the human body [are]
obviously fundamental to liberty."91 He added that "the constitu-
tional protection for the human body is surely inseparable from
concern for the mind and spirit that dwell therein."92 In trying
to say more about the constitutional significance of death, Justice
Stevens asserted that "not much may be said with confidence
about death unless it is said from faith, and that alone is reason
enough to protect the freedom to conform choices about death
to individual conscience."
93
Justice Scalia cited this last statement in making his case that
Justice Stevens explicitly condoned suicide. Justice Scalia
described his associate's view as one "that some societies have
held, and that our States are free to adopt if they wish," but he
also warned that it was "not a view imposed by our constitutional
traditions, in which the power of the State to prohibit suicide is
unquestionable."94 Justice Scalia found humane limits to requir-
ing individuals to preserve their own lives to reside not in the
Due Process clause but in the Equal Protection clause, which
"requires the democratic majority to accept for themselves and
their loved ones what they impose on you and me."95 As far as
Justice Scalia was concerned, "the federal courts have no business
in this field."96 He considered the Constitution to be silent on
the matter of when treatment is appropriately refused, or
whether suicide and assistance in it should be permitted by law.
97
Justice Stevens had a specific quarrel with the view that Mis-
souri took of life, and wished to rescue Nancy Cruzan from the
legal policy of that state as he interpreted it. He accused the Mis-
souri court of trying to define life rather than protect its sanctity.
He asserted that the "life" of a person like Cruzan was perhaps
not "life" in the sense that the Constitution and Declaration of
Independence understood it.98 At this point, Justice Stevens also
defined life in light of how he understood Nancy Cruzan's situa-
tion and he concluded:
In short, there is no reasonable ground for believing that
Nancy Beth Cruzan has any personal interest in the perpetu-
ation of what the State has decided is her life. As I have
91. Id. at 342.
92. Id. at 343.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 300.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 293.
97. Id. at 300.
98. Id. at 344-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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already suggested it would be possible to hypothesize such
an interest on the basis of theological or philosophical con-
jecture. But even to posit such a basis for the State's action
is to condemn it. It is not within the province of secular
government to circumscribe the liberties of the people by
regulations designed wholly for the purpose of establishing
a sectarian definition of life.99
Justice Stevens' contention is quite ironic. He concerned
himself with defining and asserting what personal interest Cruzan
had in her life. That is precisely what the Missouri court wanted
to be sure about. That court committed itself not to deciding
how the worth of Nancy Cruzan's life, nor what interest others
might hypothesize she had, or should have had, in its continu-
ance. They stood ready to affirm her right to refuse treatment in
her circumstances, provided that they could determine her own
view, not that of others, as to what should be done.
Justice Stevens retorted that the court should have known
that she could not possibly have had an interest in her life, given
her condition as described in the data before the courts, and that
its inability to see this stemmed from its peculiar view of life.
This impasse is prompted by Stevens' theological view. Justice
Stevens did not presume a continuous drive to preserve one's
own life, nor did he see life's worth as continuous, rather its
worth as subject to an assessment he saw as a very personal and
private matter. In contrast to justice Stevens, Missouri's Supreme
Court assumed a worth to life beyond assessment, which should
be undergirded in the State's laws in a manner that encourages
the preservation and protection of life and discourages suicide.
Refusing treatment was not viewed as compromising such a state
interest as long as it was not done in a way that imputed to indi-
viduals a view of their condition they did not actually have.
Justice Stevens berated Missouri for pursuing a policy that
made an example of Nancy Cruzan and used her life as a symbol
of its own purposes.10 0 In other words, the Missouri court
should have known when someone had no interest in living for
"[a] State that seeks to demonstrate its commitment to life may
do so by aiding those who are actively struggling for life and
health. "10 Defenders of Missouri's policy could reply that it aids
not only those actively struggling for life and health, but also
those who are flagging in that struggle, or may be ready to give
up that struggle needlessly and tragically. In response to such a
99. Id. at 350.
100. Id. at 356.
101. Id. at 357.
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defense, Justice Stevens argued that "the only apparent secular
basis for the State's interest in life is the policy's persuasive
impact upon people other than Nancy and her family."102 Since
Justice Stevens claimed that Cruzan could not possibly be viewed
as having an interest in her life except in an abstract or theologi-
cal sense, and that Missouri had no interest in the life of those
not actively seeking life and health, he had denied, at least in
theory, any secular basis for a law against assisted suicide. Mis-
souri's law was, after all, prepared to honor an individual
patient's right to refuse medical treatment; it was not prepared to
assert and honor a right to have one's life ended by an act
intended to do so immediately and for that purpose alone.
Therefore, a policy such as Missouri's did apply to Cruzan and
her family, as well as all others in that state. Whether advertently
or inadvertently, Justice Stevens saw no secular basis for such a
policy. Additionally, he rejected Missouri's contention that
"where issues invoke the concerns of medicine, ethics, morality,
philosophy and law," representative assemblies are the appropri-
ate bodies to change the policy of erring on the side of life. 03
Unless further qualified, Justice Stevens would have had the
United States Supreme Court recognize a constitutional right to
be free of any state interference in the decisions of those who
have lost all interest in continuing to live. When, if ever, the state
may or should try to prevent a suicide becomes at the very least a
matter of interpreting the interests of the individuals in question.
Justice Stevens regarded this view as secular, and Missouri's view
as theological, but he was mistaken.
Adopting his view would require that the Court define life,
which he believed Missouri should not do. In the view of Justice
Stevens, human beings are understood in the Millian way, that is,
as having by their nature no abiding interest in preserving their
own lives. In defending that theological anthropology, Justice
Stevens directly opposed the view of Hobbes and Locke that
human beings have a continuous interest in preserving their own
lives to the extent where suicide is interpreted as either an irra-
tional act, or that of a mentally distressed individual. He is also
opposing the view found in Jewish and Christian traditions that
the worth of individual lives is continuous and incalculable,
assumptions directly challenged by a deliberately planned act of
suicide or assistance in one.
The Millian, Hobbesian, Lockean, Jewish, and Christian tra-
ditions are present in American courts as our analysis has illus-
102. Id. at 350.
103. Id. at 352 n.23.
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trated and revealed. IfJustice Stevens had explicitly qualified his
reasoning in ways that made it clear that he was advocating a
constitutional right to the refusal of treatment and nothing
more, the consensus among these traditions would remain in
place. But Justice Stevens does reason in a way that directly
attacks the theological anthropologies of traditions other than
his own. He can, therefore, be said to be advocating the imposi-
tion of his own sectarian doctrine of human nature on the peo-
ple and their legislative bodies in the name of an alleged
constitutional fight that theoretically embraces assistance in sui-
cide. The Millian formulations of Stevens, privatizing decisions
about how and when one's life should end, led the Canadian Jus-
tice McLaughlin1 4 and the American Justices Rothstein1"5 and
Wright" 6 to advocate the unconstitutionality of laws against
assisting in a suicide.
The theological conflict evoked by a Millian justification for
a right to die that includes assisted suicide expresses a basis for
law that evokes or invites theological conflict. But what about
laws that forbid assisted suicide? Is it possible to articulate a non-
sectarian basis for upholding them as constitutional?
IV. A SECULAR, NON-SECTARIAN BASIS FOR LAWS AGAINST
ASSISTED SUICIDE
On what basis, then, can a legislature pass laws to protect
human life, and in particular, to try to prevent suicide? Consider
what is logically and functionally necessary for individual human
beings and their communities to exist and persist. Human
beings can only come into being if they have proclivities to pro-
create and nurture and inhibitions against killing. Human
beings and their communities can only continue to exist if these
proclivities and inhibitions exist and continue to exist. Procrea-
tion, nurture, and the protection of human life are cooperative,
communal acts, and can only be sustained over time by coopera-
tive acts. Knowledge, also essential to sustaining human life and
well being, is not only dependent on discovering what is true, but
on sufficient proclivities to tell the truth, and sufficient inhibi-
tions against lying.
104. Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 107 D.L.R.4th 342 (1993)
(McLaughlin, J., dissenting).
105. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash.
1994).
106. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, No. 94-35534, 1995 WL94679
(9th Cir. Mar. 9, 1995) (Wright, J., dissenting).
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These proclivities and inhibitions are at once requisites of
communal and individual existence and the basis of moral rights
and rights enforced by law. Fraud and breach of contracts are
lies punishable by law. Because of our proclivities and inhibi-
tions we expect to be able to rely in business on veracity and on
agreements. Yet these expectations are sometimes not met, and
such failures in responsibility can cause us individual losses, as
well as undermine the very possibility of peaceful and successful
commerce communally. As such, we support by law a right to
have our expectations met, or to be compensated when they are
not.
A similar approach is evident in our support of the nurture
and protection of human life. American and European legal sys-
tems recognize and enforce a right to be nurtured, 10 7 and laws
against killing in a wide range of circumstances. Unless these
proclivities to nurture and inhibitions against killing are suffi-
ciently strong, such laws would not ultimately be enforceable.
And despite all the ways in which people do die, whether by natu-
ral disaster, disease, accidents, failures in nurture, warfare, or
criminal killings, many communities exist and persist across the
globe, and enough people are nurtured and protected that some
among us worry that there are too many people on the planet,
now or in the future. Procreation, nurture, and the protection of
life are strong and real human tendencies, whatever else may be
true.
108
But understandably, individuals and communities are con-
cerned about whether their institutions and laws will strengthen
or weaken the proclivities and inhibitions requisite to the exist-
ence and sustenance of individual and communal life. It is
exactly that concern which Judge Sopinka of the Canadian
Supreme Court expressed in defense of the constitutionality of
the Canadian law against assisted suicide when he asserted that
"to the extent that there is a consensus, it is that human life must
be respected and we must be careful not to undermine the insti-
tutions that protect it. . . ."' Our inhibitions against killing
include inhibitions against killing ourselves. Judge Sopinka
rightly sees the role of the Canadian law against assisted suicide
as directly addressing those inhibitions when he asserted that "In
107. For example, laws governing divorce settlements require the non-
custodial parent to contribute to the custodial parent's financial support of the
children that resulted from their former marriage. See MAv ANN GLENDON,
ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW: AMERiCAN FAILuREs, EUROPEAN
CHALLENGES (1978).
108. See also DvcK, supra note 22, at 123-47.
109. Rodriguez, 107 D.L.R.4th at 70.
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upholding the respect for life [the statute] may discourage those
who consider that life is unbearable at a particular moment, or
who perceive themselves to be a burden upon others, from com-
mitting suicide." al ° One could add that such a law also encour-
ages those who can and will act to prevent a suicide.
The concern over what happens when a legal system permits
individuals to be assisted by physicians deliberately to end their
lives cannot be dismissed as based on mere speculation. In the
Netherlands, physicians are currently allowed to comply with
requests to assist patients in suicides or to immediately end the
lives of patients (euthanasia). The results have been carefully
documented by a government sponsored study.."' Although all
deliberate acts to end life are supposed to be based on persistent
requests by patients, 1,000 annual instances of active involuntary
euthanasia have occurred, 12 in addition to 2,300 instances of
voluntary euthanasia and 400 instances of physician-assisted sui-
cide.' 3 There were also 13,511 annual cases of intentionally
inducing death: 4,941 cases of deliberate excessive doses of mor-
phine1 1 4 and 8,570 cases of withholding or withdrawing life-pro-
longing interventions for the sake of causing death.1 5 These
intentional inducements of death were done without the consent
of the patients involved.
Why do physicians do this? They speak of the "low quality of
life" of their patients, the impossibility of improvement, and of
the inability of families to take it anymore. Missouri's insistence
that there should be clear evidence as to what patients think
about discontinuing treatment, when seen in the context of cur-
rent practices in the Netherlands, would appear to be an essen-
tial effort both to enhance the freedom and to protect the lives
of individual patients. Perhaps Missouri's interest in life is not as
abstract and impersonal as depicted by justice Stevens. The inhi-
bitions against killing and deliberately hastening death among
physicians may well be weakened by the legal permission to end
life. In any event, the inhibitions of Dutch physicians against
ending life are presently too weak, not even strong enough to
insist that patients be given the opportunity to continue their
lives if they so choose. Having life is also a requisite of having
freedom. There is a liberty interest in having one's life pro-
110. Id.
111. Richard Fenigsen, The Report of the Dutch Governmental Committee on
Euthanasia, 7 Iss. IN L. & MED. 339, 339-44 (1991).
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tected, and to be able to defend it against those who would end
it, however well intended any effort to end life may be.'
16
There is also another liberty interest that is violated when
there are no laws against assisted suicide. In the practice of
medicine there are and will be false diagnoses and prognoses. It
follows that some patients, if legally granted a right to do so, will
ask to have their lives ended because they mistakenly believe that
their lives will soon end, or will be of a very low quality. For some
of these patients there will never be an opportunity to discover
that they might have lived and lived well. This is, in part, what it
means to err on the side of life, as do laws against assisted sui-
cide. We can predict such unfortunate deaths in the absence of
laws against suicide. We can also predict deaths that are less than
voluntary because of the pressures to save time and money. In
this area, one can also predict that economic and racial discrimi-
nation will not be totally absent from the settings in which irre-
versible decisions about hastening death would be made." 
7
Suicides are also copied and that undermines liberty interests as
well.
In the brief compass of this essay, it would take us too far
afield to lay out all the arguments that merit attention in decid-
ing policies related to assisted suicide. Certainly no policy should
be devoid of positive measures to reduce pain and suffering.
There should be the freedom for patients to choose comfort
interventions and reject interventions that interfere with such
measures. The right to refuse medical treatment is an essential
ingredient of individual freedom, but also of aiding efforts to
relieve and/or end possible sources of suffering. How to live
while dying should include choices about medical interventions
as it does when we are not dying. We do have a broad consensus,
encompassing Millian, Hobbesian, Jewish and Christian tradi-
tions, that choices that reject life-sustaining treatment do not
necessarily compromise the regard for life, nor symbolize, as
would actions deliberately ending our lives, that we consider our
lives of little or no worth. This consensus breaks down when
116. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, No. 94-35534, 1995 WL 94679
(9th Cir. Mar. 9, 1995). Both Justice Noonan in his majority decision and
Justice O'Scannlian, in his concurrence in upholding the constitutionality of
Washington State's law against assisted suicide, take precisely this view of the
liberty interest at stake, and also point to the problems raised by practices in the
Netherlands, including the role of physicians as killers.
117. This represents another argument present in the judgment that
Washington State's law against assisted suicide is constitutional.
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what Glendon called "a streamlined version of Mill"11 is made
the basis for deciding the constitutionality of assisted suicide. It
is a version of Mill that neglects Mill's assertion of social rules
that protect "the very groundwork of our existence" and help
determine our "social feelings" as human beings. 1 9
Patients and physicians also need more knowledge of the
enormous gains in our ability to control pain. These are all
important aspects of policy in the care of those who may think
that immediate death is the only or best option for coping with
severe illnesses. For a more detailed examination of such issues,
I refer the reader elsewhere.
1 20
What this essay offers as reasons for maintaining laws against
assisted suicide is merely a sketch of a framework. The framework
is developed by asking about what human proclivities and inhibi-
tions are logically and functionally identifiable as those without
which human life and communities could not come to be, and to
be sustained. One can then ask what laws are essential to try to
ensure the strength and persistence of these requisites of com-
munity and the human rights they function to render actual and
attainable. All of this has been more fully discussed and elabo-
rated elsewhere.121 Hopefully, enough has been said about the
requisites of community to make sense of the long-standing tradi-
tions that have supported laws against assisted suicide and the
shared moral propensities on which they have depended and
may yet depend. Hopefully, enough has been said to indicate
how these same requisites of community support the constitu-
tionality of laws against suicide.
118. GLENDON, supra note 9, at 72. The reader should note that it is this
"streamlined version of Mill" that also influences justices who resort to it, to
wipe out any moral and legal distinction between refusing treatment and being
assisted in a suicide. The failure of the lower court to make this distinction is
noted by the Court of Appeals that upheld the constitutionality of Washington
State's law against assisted suicide. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, No.
94-355534, 1995 WL 94679 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 1995).
119. MILL, supra note 79, at 197.
120. DYCK, supra, note 22, at 286-304.
121. Id. See also RM. VEATCH, DEATH, DYING AND THE BIOLOGICAL
REVOLUTION (1989); MARGARET P. BATTIN, THE LAST WoRsT DEATH: EssAYs IN
BIOETHICS ON THE END OF LIFE (1994).
1995]

